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Abstract
This paper examines the implications of increasing globalisation of
stock market ownership on the economics of protection. Current data on
European, Japanese and Australian stock exchanges indicate that over
30 per cent of the stock market is foreign-owned in most cases, a large
increase on a couple of decades ago. Foreign share ownership in the USA
lags behind these levels, but is increasing fast.This degree of foreign share-
ownership is likely to change qualitatively the nature of the response of
governments to FDI and support for domesticrms. In particular, two
worked examples, based upon duopoly theory, suggest that the level of
foreign share-ownership is su¢ cient to render protection unattractive.
Thanks to Daniel Gros, Rafael Plata, Ben Ferrett and Vasileis Zikos for advice and sug-
gestions. Any errors are my own.
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This paper examines the implications of increasing globalisation of share
ownership on the economics of protection. In particular, I examine the argument
traditionally made for such protection on the basis of a prot-shifting motive.
If proper account is taken account of the foreign ownership share of national
champions, the prot-shift arguments in favour of protecting such rms are
greatly reduced. Current data on European stock exchanges indicate that over
30 per cent of the stock market is foreign-owned in most cases, a large increase
on a couple of decades ago.
The issue which I address is whether this degree of foreign share-ownership
is likely to change qualitatively the nature of the response of governments to
FDI and support for domestic rms. In particular, two worked examples,
based upon duopoly theory, suggest that the level of foreign share-ownership is
su¢ cient to render protection unattractive.
1 Prot shift and protection
Much of the literature on strategic trade policy is reviewed in Brander (1995).
Models such as the Brander (1981), Brander and Spencer (1985) or Eaton and
Grossman (1986) assume that one rm is domestically-owned, while the other is
foreign owned. The government therefore has an incentive to intervene, via sub-
sidies or other policies, to favour its own company. The key motive is prot-shift:
if a market is imperfectly competitive, then rms will charge a prot markup 
over marginal cost, where  is typically expected to be close to 1=(1   (1=")),
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where " is the rms perceived own-price demand elasticity, based upon its con-
jectures of rival rms behaviour. Therefore, if marginal costs are constant,
prots will account for proportion =(1+) of total turnover. A policy such as
a tari¤ or quota or subsidy, or the use of regulations to keep a foreign entrant
out, would be expected to worsen consumer welfare: however, if the share of
prots in output, =(1 + ); is su¢ ciently large, and if the policy raises the do-
mestic rmsshare of those prots by a su¢ cient amount, then the policy may
benet national welfare at the margin (at the expense of foreigners). Prot-shift
is frequently cited as a motivation for the government intervention in a number
of industries, such as civil aircraft manufacturing.1
It should be noted that there are other possible reasons for protecting a
domestic rm, apart from prot-shift. These include exploitation of static and
dynamic scale economies or spillovers, distributional factors, the desirability of
maintaining domestic head-o¢ ce capability, the supposed greater accountability
of local rms to local regulators etc. Nevertheless, I will concentrate upon prot
shift as the main motive in this short paper.
2 Internationalisation of Share Ownership
A key feature of the papers discussed is that rms can easily be classied ac-
cording to their nationality: in other words, they assume 100% of shares in
the domestic rm(s) are owned by domestic nationals, and 100% of shares in
1See Pavcnik, 2002.
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foreign rms are owned by foreigners. While this may be the case when a rm
is nationalised, or where it is a private company (owned by, say, a family - take
the Quandt familys ownership of BMW as a classic example), it is unlikely
to be the case with a public limited company.2 Table 1, below, shows recent
estimates of the ownership distribution of shares in various European countries.
E¤ectively, shares can be split into those owned directly by the state (proportion
s), those directly owned by foreigners, proportion ; those owned by other rms
and nancial institutions based in the domestic country quoted on the stock
market, proportion m and those directly owned by pension funds and the like,
proportion p = 1  s   m: If the rate of corporate taxation is t, then a lower
bound estimate for the share of prots of domestically-based companies (net of
tax) which actually ends up accruing to foreigners is
L = : (1)
L should be considered a lower bound estimate, because it is likely that many
of the other rms and nancial institutions who own shares within the country
are themselves partly foreign-owned (and a proportion of the shareholdings in
those institutions which is registered to other domestically-owned companies
will also be foreign-owned etc.). A higher estimate of the proportion of prots
2Recent papers arguing that the denition of national champions, at least in Europe, is
getting increasingly blurred include Edwards and Gros (2006) and Veron (2006).
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which actually ends up in companieshands might therefore be
H =  + m+ m
2 + :::;
= =(1 m): (2)
Taking the examples of Germany, France, the UK and Italy in 2003 the
structure of share ownership, as quoted by FEESE, was:
Germany* France UK Italy
Foreign investors 17.5 34.8 32.3 14.4%
Domestic investors
Collective investment 9.5 28.5 50.9 10.6%
Banks and savings banks 7.5 13.3 2.2 5.2%
Bond Issuing Mortgage companies 11.1
Others not identied 3.3%
Private Non-Financial companies 45.6 23.7 1.9 29.7%
Individual investors/households 14.1 8.5 14.9 26.6%
Public sector 5.8 4.5 0.0 10.2%
Table 1: Principal European Economies, 2003, structure of share ownership.
(*Germany 2002).
In the case of Italy, our lower-bound estimate for foreign ownership would
be L = 14:4% in 2003. For the higher estimate, quite which of these cate-
gories should be considered m is not easy - an upper bound estimate would be
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everything excluding the Public sector and private individuals. In this case,
an upper bound estimate for foreign share ownership in Italy would be just
over 28% of the total. Most other European countries are considerably more
internationalised still, as the table below shows.
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(source FESE*) Foreign % of total Foreign % of foreign+indiv+public
Slovakia 86.0 97.7
Hungary 72.6 84.6
Netherlands 69.0 84.1
Poland 53.0 88.2
Lithuania 51.8 81.7
Belgium 40.3 78.9
Australia 40.0 64.5
Portugal 38.9 70.3
Spain 35.1 57.2
France 34.8 72.8
Sweden 33.2 55.1
UK 32.3 68.4
Greece 31.3 51.2
Norway 27.8 36.9
Denmark 27.3 51.9
Japan 23.7 53.6
Germany 17.5 46.8
Italy 14.4 28.1
Slovenia 8.0 15.5
Table 2: The share of foreign ownership in various stock markets, latest
(2003 for most, 2004 for Japan and Australia, 2002 for Germany). *Sources
for Australia ASX, for Japan World Federation of Exchanges.
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Looking at Table 2, in most countries at least 1=3 of shares are now foreign-
owned, and the true gure may well be over 50% in most cases.
Figure 1, below, derived from the same data source, shows that data is
missing for most European countries prior to 1995, and that foreign shareowning
uctuates over time. However, in a number of countries for which long time-
series are available, the upward trend, decade-on-decade, is remarkable. For
example, direct foreign share ownership in the UK rose from around 8% in 1985
to a third today.
Figure 1
Comparable data on foreign equity ownership in the United States is rela-
tively hard to come by. Bertaut et al (2006) estimate foreigners owned 10 per
cent of U.S. equity in June 2005 - an increase from 5 per cent in 1994 - though
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their paper outlines a number of data issues. Interestingly, this number falls far
short of foreign holdings of U.S. securities.
2.1 Corporate taxation
Since  is the share of post-tax prots which accrue to foreigners, we also need
to correct for corporate taxation. From Devereux and Gri¢ ths database3 I
use estimates of the e¤ective average tax rate in 2005, adjusted for time- and
country-specic ination. These tax rates range from just under 20% to just over
30% in the selected sample of countries. When adjustment is made for this, then
(for those countries on which tax and stock market ownership data is available),
the lower estimate of the share of prots accruing to foreigners ranges from
10.8% in Italy to 52.4% in the Netherlands, while the higher estimate ranges
from 21% in Italy to 63.7% in the Netherlands.
3Available on http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications.php?publication_id=3210. Details of
the methodology are given in Devereux et al (2002).
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Tax Lower Higher
Belgium 25.7 29.9 58.6
France 24.6 26.2 54.9
Germany 30.1 12.2 32.7
Greece 20.5 24.9 40.7
Italy 25.2 10.8 21.0
Norway 23.1 21.4 28.3
Portugal 19.7 32.1 56.5
Spain 25.9 26.0 42.3
Sweden 20.1 26.5 44.0
Netherlands 24.1 52.4 63.9
UK 23.1 24.9 52.7
Japan 29.2 16.8 37.9
Australia 25.7 29.7 47.9
Table 3: E¤ective average corporate taxation and lower and higher estimates
of the share of prots accruing abroad.
11
3 Implications of foreign share ownership for
protectionist policies: export subsidies with
a duopoly
The rst example I choose to look at is the classic case of duopolists from
two countries selling into a third country market. This is an issue given some
prominence by the classic paper of Brander and Spencer (1985), and, while
the analysis is simplied, is widely regarded as having some relevance to real
policy issues - notably the Boeing/Airbus dispute. This essentially looks at a
two-stage game between the two rms and the two governments of their home
countries. Following a standard model formulation, I assume that the rms
have identical costs and make indistinguishable products, and compete for the
third country market in a subgame on the basis of Cournot conjectures about
each others output. The two exporting country governments, however, both
have a potential motive to intervene in the export market, each subsidising its
rms exports, with the intention of gaining a larger share of the market and
hence a greater share of combined prots (which are supranormal because of
the duopoly). In this higher-level game, each two governments are assumed to
form a xed conjecture of the other governments likely subsidy level.
To set up the market more formally: two identical rms are competing for
market share in a third country. Price is given by
P = D 1C ; (3)
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where DC is combined output,
DC = D1 +D2: (4)
Marginal cost for each rm is
MCf = 1  Sf ; (5)
where Sf is a subsidy. Total revenue for rm f is
Rf = PDf ;
Rc1 = (D1 +D
c
2)
 1D1: (6)
The equilibrium conditions are given by
DC = D1 +D2 = [(MC1 +MC2)=((1 + ))]
1= 1; (7)
P = (MC1 +MC2)=(1 + );
= (2  S1   S2)=(1 + ): (8)
and
 = (MC1   MC2)=(MC2   MC1); (9)
where  is dened as the ratio D2=D1, which implies that D1 = DC=(1+) and
D2 = DC=(1 + ):
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The two governments can manipulate the subsidy, S1 or S2, to induce their
rm to increase its output, so gaining a prot shift. I assume both governments
can correctly read the outcome of the Cournot subgame between the two rm,
and are engaged in their own policy game. Each government takes as given the
other governments subsidy level.
Government 1 seeks to maximise
W1 = (1  )1   S1D1;
= (1  )PD1   (1  )(1  S1)D1   S1D1;
= D1((1  )(P   1)  S1): (10)
@W1=@S1 = ((1 )(P  1) S1)(@D1=@S1)+(1 )D1@P=@S1 D1: (11)
Note that
P = (2  S1   Sc2)=(1 + );
@P=@S1 =  1=(1 + ): (12)
Also
D1 = DC=(1 + );
= (P=)1= 1=(1 + ): (13)
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Assuming the two rms and countries are symmetrical, in Nash equilibrium
S1 = S

2 = S
; D1 = D2 = D. Consequently
In equilibrium
c = ((1  )  S1 + Sc2)(1  Sc2   (1  S1)) 1; (14)
@c=dS1 =  (1  Sc2   (1  S1)) 1   ((1  )  S1 + Sc2)(1  Sc2   (1  S1)) 2;
=  (1  Sc2   (1  S1)) 1   (1  Sc2   (1  S1)) 1;
=  ((1 + )=(1  Sc2   (1  S1))): (15)
But, if the equilibrium is symmetrical,  = 1 and S1 = S

2 = S
: Conse-
quently
@c=dS1 =  ((1 + )=((1  )(1  S)): (A)
P  = 2(1  S)=(1 + ); (B)
Dc = (P
=)1=( 1);
D1 = (P
=)1=( 1)=2; (C)
@Dc=@S1 = (@D

c=@P
)(@P =@S1);
= (4=(1  )(1 + ))(D1=P ): (D)
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D1 = D

c=(1 + );
@D1=@S1 = ((@D

c=@S1)=(1 + ))  (1 + ) 2Dc (@c=dS1);
= (1=2)(@Dc=@S1)  (1=4)Dc (@c=dS1);
= (1=2)(@Dc=@S1)  (1=2)D1(@c=dS1);
= (1=2)[(@Dc=@S1) D1(@c=dS1)]: (E)
@P =@S1 =  1=(1 + ): (F)
Consequently, in equilibrium @W1=@S1 = 0 ==>
@W1=@S1 = ((1 )(P   1) S)(@D1=@S1)+ (1 )D1@P=@S1 D1 = 0:
(G)
A-G give us 7 equations in 7 unknowns, S, @c=dS1; P ; Dc ; @D

c=@S1; @P
=@S1; @D1=@S1:
The simplest initial method is numerical simulation.
3.1 Results of simulations
Figure 2 below shows the Nash equilibrium subsidy levels of the game between
the regulators, where their rms sell into a third market as a Cournot duopoly.
It can be seen that subsidy levels are higher where demand is less elastic (since
the duopoly yields higher prots in this case, giving a greater prot shift), but
that subsidies decline steadily as foreign share ownership increases, and that
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the lines for all elasticity cases intersect at around 1/3 foreign shareownership.
Above this level, governnments actually prefer to tax their rm, rather than
subsidise it.
Figure 2
The diagram shows that, for all elasticities, the equilibrium level of subsidies,
S = 0, when foreign ownership, is around 1=3:In fact, we can formally derive
the proposition below:
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Proposition 1 In a game of two identical producers from di¤erent nations act-
ing as a Cournot duopoly in a third country, where marginal costs are constant
and the dmand elasticity is constant, the Nash equilibrium subsidy level for the
two governments will equal zero when foreign ownership of shares is 1/3 of the
total.
============================================================================================
Proof of Proposition 1
We want to solve equations A-G to nd the value of  = , which gives
S = 0. Consequently, we substitute for S = 0 in A-G.
@c=dS1 =  (1 + )=(1  ): (A)
P  = 2=(1 + ): (B)
D1 = (P
=)1=( 1)=2;
= 2(2 )=( 1)((1 + ))1=(1 ): (C)
@Dc=@S1 = (4=(1  )(1 + ))(D1=P );
= (2=(1  ))D1 (D)
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@D1=@S1 = (1=2)[(@D

c=@S1) D1(@c=dS1)];
= (1=2)[(2=(1  ))D1 +D1(1 + )=(1  )];
= (D1=2(1  ))[3 + ]: (E)
@P =@S1 =  1=(1 + ): (F)
@W1=@S1 = ((1 )(P   1) S)(@D1=@S1)+ (1 )D1@P=@S1 D1 = 0;
(G)
==>
((1  )(1  )=(1 + ))(D1=2(1  ))[3 + ]  (1  )D1=(1 + )  D1 = 0;
((1  )=(1 + ))(1=2)[3 + ]  (1  )=(1 + )   = 0;
(1  )[3 + ]  2(1  )  2(1 + ) = 0;
[3 + ]  2 = 2(1 + ) + [3 + ]  2;
1 +  = 3(1 + );
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 = 1=3:
============================================================================================
It is worth noting that this critical value is very close to the level of foreign
share ownership reported on most European stock markets at present. This
casts some doubt on the common assumption that export subsidies will, in fact,
be a common feature of such markets.
4 Entry of a Foreign Competitor to a Domestic
Monopolist
The second example could be seen as a case of economic patriotism.4 This
is a loosely-dened term, which appears to be mostly concerned with prevent-
ing foreign entry into strategicindustries and takeover of national champion
companies. In this case, I will concentrate on the case where a foreign rm seeks
(maybe as part of a general industry deregulation) to move in to challenge a
local monopolst. Orthodox theory of foreign direct investment would indicate
that there is a potential cost of such a policy in terms of loss of competitive
benets and, potentially, a loss of e¢ ciency. However, where the industry is im-
perfectly competitive (as any industry with a national championwill be), there
is, in theory, an o¤setting gain from the protection: that of prot shift. Quite
4See, for example, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4837150.stm , which refers to the
De Villepin government in France and its economic patriotismagenda. Also Gros, 2006.
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simply, a monopoly yields a prot, and there may be circumstances under which
it is preferable, from a point-of-view of national self-interest, for the industry to
remain monopolistic, with that prot staying in the hands of domestic owners,
rather than allowing the entry of foreign rms, who repatriate prot abroad.
Clearly, there is only a trade-o¤ between prot-shift and competition where
the domestic rm is, indeed, owned by home nationals to a signicant degree
more than the foreign rm. The interesting question, however, is how large a
foreign shareholding in the domestic rm would constitute signicantin this
case, in the sense that it would undermine the domestic preference for protection
of the national champion.
Consider an industry (or perhaps a distinct section of an industry) where
there is currently a single, domestic producer. New entry is blocked (there being
sizeable sunk costs in entering the industry as a whole): however, there is one
foreign rm which is capable of entering, and willing to enter. I will assume
both rms have identical and constant marginal costs of $1 per unit, and that
the elasticity of demand for the industrys products within the country is ":I
initially assume the good is not internationally tradable, though this can be
easily relaxed. Also that both rms produce indistinguishable produce, and
that neither rm can commit to output in advance.
The choice facing the government of the host country is therefore whether
to persist with a protected monopoly (I assume there is no price regulation)
or to allow the foreign rm to enter and create a duopoly. In the latter situa-
tion, prices will be lower and output higher, so beneting consumers. Half of
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the duopoly prots, however, will be sent abroad. The foreign rm is entirely
foreign-owned, whereas share (1 ) of the domestic rm is owned by domestic
residents. I will ignore prot taxes in this simple analysis, though they serve,
in practice, to reduce :
4.1 Monopoly
Consider rst the situation under a monopoly. Consumers have a utility function
U = D; (16)
where D is total domestic demand and 0 <  < 1. If consumers choose D to
equate marginal utility to price, P , then
P = D 1: (17)
This implies that the price elasticity of demand, "; is 1=(   1): Total revenue
for the rm
R = D: (18)
Consumer surplus is utility less expenditure (which equals R).
If a single rm supplies the market, its marginal revenue will equal 2D 1.
The rms total cost is assumed to equal marginal cost (which I have set, without
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loss of generality, to equal 1) times output
C = D: (19)
Setting marginal cost equal to marginal revenue, we obtain the monopolists
level of output
DM = (
2)1=1 : (20)
The consequent price under monopoly is
PM = D
 1
M ;
= 1=: (21)
Prots are given by
M = PMDM  DM : (22)
If proportion  of national income is sent abroad, national welfare is
WM = VM + (1  )M : (23)
4.2 Duopoly
Now we compare this with the situation where a foreign rm enters, and there
is a Cournot duopoly.
DC = D1C +D2C : (24)
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The two rms are assumed to symmetrical, and neither rm can commit to
output in advance. Consequently, if we look at the domestic rm (denoted with
subscript 1),
1C = R1C  D1C : (25)
Prot maximisation implies setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost
(= 1), and since rm 1 is forming Cournot conjectures about D2, which I denote
Dc2, then
@Rc1=@D1 = (D1 +D
c
2)
 1 + (   1)D1(D1 +Dc2) 2 = 1: (26)
In equilibrium, D2 = Dc2 = D1, so
(2D1C)
 1 + (   1)D1C(2D1C) 2 = 1;
D1C(2D1C)
 2(1 + ) = 1;
2D1C = (2=(1 + ))
1=( 1);
= ((1 + )=2)1=(1 ): (27)
Note that
PC = (2D1C)
 1;
= ((1 + )=2) 1;
= 2=(1 + ): (28)
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Since both rms have identical market shares
U1C = (2D1C)
;
V1C = U1C   2PCD1C : (29)
Also
1C = PCD1C  D1C : (30)
Consequently,
WC = V1C + (1  )1C : (31)
4.3 Solution and comparison
Rather than solving these two models algebraically, it is more sensible in this
case to carry out a numerical simulation for each model, based upon alternative
values of " and . The scale parameter, ; can be shown to have no e¤ect on
whether the country will prefer a protected monopoly or a duopoly.
In general, the more elastic demand is (the higher " or the lower  is),
the more likely, other things equal, a country will prefer economic patriotism.
This is because the costs of monopoly, in terms of loss of consumer surplus, are
less when demand is elastic. There is therefore a critical threshold elasticity,
", above which the country will prefer a domestic monopoly to a half-foreign
duopoly. Simulations show that, when there is no foreign share-ownership in the
domestic rm (i.e.  = 0), the critical value " lies at around 2:7. It is worth
noting this critical elasticity probably lies well above the demand elasticity for
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some monopolistic services (such as water or electricity5), but it is possibly lower
than that for some goods subsectors, or particularly for goods suppliers where
there is a single domestic supplier competing with a foreign competitive fringe.6
It is therefore quite conceivable that national champions in many industries may
be protected for prot-shift reasons.
Now consider the impact of allowing  to alter, representing a rise in foreign
share ownership. Simulations indicate the following relationship:
Foreign share  Critical elasticity "
0% 2.7
5% 3.0
10% 3.6
15% 4.4
20% 5.9
25% 9.1
30% 20.0
Table 3: Relationship between foreign share and critical elasticity for pro-
tecting a domestic monopoly.
The pattern shown in Table 3 indicates that, at low share ownership levels,
the marginal e¤ect of raising foreign share ownership on the critical elasticity is
not great: however, it becomes increasingly important, and once foreign share
ownership rises above 20% the curve (as shown in Figure 3 below) becomes
5Although the actions of a price regulator may make these industries behave as if they had
a higher demand elasticity.
6For example, a recent survey article by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) indicates that
most traded goods have elasticities of substitution between di¤erent national producers of
between 5 and 10.
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Threshold elasticity for a country preferring a domestic
monopoly to entry of a foreign Cournot competitor
0
5
10
15
20
25
0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
Foreign ownership of stock market
El
as
tic
ity
Threshold elasticity
steep. In other words, at the kind of foreign share-ownership level seen in most
European countries today, the prot-shifting case for protection of a domestic
monopolist breaks down quite rapidly.
Figure 3.
5 Summary and Conclusions
The literature on protectionism and export subsidies in the case of oligopoly has
been dominated by the idea that governments will compete to help theirrm
achieve a prot shift, making use of a perceived rst-mover advantage. This has
been modelled with a class of two-stage games, in which rms play a Cournot
duopoly subgame, while two governments seeking to inuence this are e¤ectively
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engaged in a higher-level game between themselves. The general outcome is a
Nash equilibrium in which the governments both intervene in trade.
This line of analysis became popular at a time when the great bulk of shares
in any major countrys rms were usually held by domestic nationals. This is no
longer the case. Analysis of European data suggests that typical share-ownership
by foreigners is now over a third in many countries, and this could well be a
signicant underestimate. Even when account is taken of corporate taxation,
the share of prots accruing to foreigners is 20-30 per cent in most countries
on the lower estimate, while, on a higher estimate, taking account of indirect
share ownership, it may well be over half in many cases. This undermines the
prot-shifting motive for the governments.
Data on Japan and Australia show a picture broadly consistent with Europe.
Information on the United States is harder to come by, but suggests that foreign
ownership of the U.S. stock market is around 10 per cent, though increasing fast.
Consequently, I reopen two sample duopoly games, to gain an idea of the
likely point, in practice, at which the subsidising or protectionist motive will
break down, as foreign share ownership rises. In the rst game, of export sub-
sidy into a third market, equilibrium subsidies cease to be positive when foreign
ownership of stock markets reaches 1=3. The second game - of blocking the
entrant of a foreign rival to a domestic monopolist - again reaches the conclu-
sion that protection ceases to be desirable at levels of 20   33% foreign share
ownership.
It is too early to say whether this result carries across to a wider class of
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models: probably each model specication would need examination. However,
a preliminary conclusion would be that standard analysis of prot shift mo-
tives for protection is probably no longer robust for many countries, given the
internationalisation of capital markets.
A slight caveat is that governmentsor electoratesperceptions may not yet
have caught up with the developments in rm ownership. Consequently, it is
quite possible that protectionist policies and economic patriotismmay survive
for some time yet, even when they make no economic sense for the countries
concerned.
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